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specifically overruled the provisions of Swain v, Alabama/ 380 U.S.
202 (1965) which required a showing of a systematic use of
peremptory challenges to keep minorities off juries.
The major contention raised in the Respondent's brief was
that Batson should not be applied retroactively to this case.

The

Respondent also argued that the facts in this case did not support
the conclusion that the venireperson in question, John Lopez, is
Hispanic.

Both of these contentions are without merit.

After Respondent submitted his brief the United States
Supreme Court issued an opinion dealing with the retroactive
application of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
(1986).

, 90 L.Ed. 2d 69

In Griffith v. Kentucky, Case No. 85-5221, 40 Cr. L. 3169

(January 14, 1987) the Supreme Court held that Batson applied
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct
review.

The instant case is on direct review to this Court and thus

Batson is clearly applicable contrary to the State's assertion.
Batson established a two-step process by which a defendant
may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by a
prosecutor in the use of his peremptory challenges*

First, the

defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group
and that the prosecutor has used peremptory challenges to remove
from the venire members of the defendant's race.

A defendant may

rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury
selection process that permits those to discriminate who are of a
mind to discriminate.

90 L.Ed. 2d at 87.
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poor jurors for blue collar crimes (Addendum D of Appellant's
Brief).

Finally, Mr. Lopez was in every other way qualified to sit

on the jury.

Mr. Lopez is L.D.S., studied accounting at LDS

Business College, is married, has a steady job and lives within
blocks of another juror who the prosecutor allowed to remain on the
jury (T. 179, 194).
All of this evidence taken together raises a clear
inference that the only reason the prosecutor used a peremptory
challenge to remove Mr. Lopez from the petit jury was the fact that
Mr. Lopez is Hispanic.

Respondent's reliance on Phillips v. State,

496 N.E. 2d 87 (Ind. 1986) is misplaced.

The court in Phillips,

however, found a neutral explanation for the prosecutor's challenge
to each juror that was readily apparent from the record.

Each of

the veniremen in Phillips were removed because they either indicated
they were acquainted with potential witnesses or had relatives who
had been convicted in the county.
apparent in the instant case.

No such neutral explanation is

Mr. Lopez was in every way an

acceptable juror.
The Appellant in this case raised an inference that Mr.
Lopez was removed by the prosecutor on account of race.

The burden

thus shifted to the prosecutor to come forward with a neutral
explanation for the challenge as required in Batson.

The prosecutor

in this case refused to come forward with a netural explanation (T.
201) and thus the Appellant's conviction should be reversed so that
he can be tried before a jury that has been chosen free from any
discrimination.
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POINT II.
(Reply to Respondent's Point II.)
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED BY THE STATE
TO ESTABLISH GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
In the Appellant's opening brief the Appellant argued that
the evidence in this case was so "inherently improbable" that this
Court should reverse his convictions.

To support this argument the

Appellant included in his opening brief Addenda A and F.

Addendum F

was a copy of State's Exhibits 22 and 24 which the victim had
confused at trial. Addendum A was a transcript of the line-up that
the victim had attended; the transcript was introduced as
Defendant's Exhibit 28 to show what instructions the victim had
received at the line-up.
In its response brief, the State contends that the
transcript of the line-up and state's exhibits 22 and 24 are not
part of the record (Resp. Brief p.14).
without merit.

This contention is totally

The transcript of the line-up was introduced into

evidence at trial and was received as Defendant's Exhibit 28.
Respondent also contends that Appellant is seeking a de novo review
of evidence.

Actually, what the Appellant seeks is a review of the

evidence to determine if it was "inherently improbable."
Rule 11(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides, "The original papers and exhibits filed in the district
court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, and the index prepared
by the clerk of the district court shall constitute the record on
appeal in all cases."

(Emphasis Added)

In this case as all three

items were admitted into evidence as exhibits, there can be no

- 5 -

question that they are a part of the record on appeal.

Furthermore

a staff member from the Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, went to the
clerk of this Court and found these items in the evidence envelope
on file in this case.
Appellant argues that the evidence introduced in this case
was "inherently improbable."

The applicable standard of review is

that announced in State v. Petreey 659 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983), which
gives this Court the right to review a jury verdict to determine if
the evidence is "inherently improbable."

If that standard is

applied to this case, the evidence against Mr. Cantu can only be
found to have been insufficient.

The inconsistant, often-mistaken

identifications of the defendant by the victim were the only
evidence which linked Mr. Cantu to the crimes for which he was
convicted.

As noted in Appellant's Brief at 14-22, these

misidentifications were insufficient evidence upon which to base a
conviction.
POINT III.
(Reply to Respondent's Point IV.)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING AN AIDING AND ABETTING
INSTRUCTION WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH ACTIVITY.
In his opening brief, the Appellant argued that the trial
court erred in giving an aiding and abetting instruction because
there was no evidence of such activity.

The only evidence which

placed the Appellant at the victim's home at the time of the assault
was the victim's eyewitness identification.

Therefore, according to

the prosecution's theory, Mr. Cantu could only be found guilty of
being a principal and not an aider or abettor.
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Respondent contends that the Appellant waived his right to
object to the instruction because defense counsel did not state a
reason for objecting to the instruction.

In this case the entire

defense rested on the fact that although that Defendant had been in
the victim's home earlier in the evening, he had left well before
the assault occurred.

Thus the basis for the objection was clear

and consistent with the defense in general.
Even if this Court finds that the objection which was made
(T. 649) was not specific enough, this Court recognized that some
instructional errors may still be reviewed to prevent manifest
injustice.

State v. Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976).

This is a case where an aiding and abetting instruction may
have produced a "manifest injustice."

In this case the only

evidence placing the Appellant in the victim's home at the time of
the assault was the eyewitness identification, by the victim.

If

the jury did not believe this identification it might still have
convicted the Appellant due to this erroneous instruction.

Since it

is impossible to determine under which theory the jury convicted the
Appellant, this erroneous instruction was manifestly unjust and may
have led to a conviction unsupported by the evidence.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Juan de
Dios Cantu, asks this Court to reverse his convictions and remand
his case to the District Court for a new trial, dismissal of the
charges, or entry of conviction for Burglary, a second degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

C^Sj

day of E^brUiu/, 1987.

JO CKRQfL NESSET-SALE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, JO CAROL NESSET-SALE, hereby certify that four copies of
the foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, this

day of February, 1987.

JCt-CftkOL NESSET-SALE

Attorney for Appellant
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